Redirecting Buybacks to Protocol-Owned Liquidity

Thanks for your responses. Just to clarify it was @ed.pylon who raised the governance proposal #4 for “Establishing the Pylon Treasury,” not on my end. Given advice from @Woody, I decided to wait to see more of the community responses before going about and posting a governance poll.

I am, however, thinking of putting up my own governance poll, following up on Ed’s govt proposal #4, which currently looks like it’ll pass. This new governance poll, building on my initial idea will set up an initial layout for how to allocate the UST yields generated on Pylon Gateway for MINE stakers.

Given that the Pylon Treasury governance poll (#4) passes, this proposal aims to lay out an initial distribution model for Pylon’s treasury. The specific percentages and numbers allocated for each section can be adjusted in later governance polls as we move forward with more polls. That said, these numbers are roughly in reference to what some of the other voices in the forum have been saying:

  1. The first part of this proposal is to retain 25% of yields generated for weekly MINE buybacks to be distributed to MINE stakers (similar to the current buyback model). It’ll be better to phase out the MINE buybacks slowly over time, instead of making a sudden halt from the beginning of the treasury launch.

  2. The second part of this proposal is to let 50% of UST yields accrue in Anchor Protocol, held as aUST, for future treasury swaps, exchange listings, etc. The aim of this is to help build a solid foundation of UST that can be flexibly used and governed by the community of MINE stakers.

  3. The final part of this proposal is to use the remaining 25% of yields to provide additional liquidity to the UST-MINE pair. Amid this 25%, 50% of the UST will buy back MINE while the other 50% will be held in UST. The MINE and UST will be paired to form the MINE-UST LP token, with the MINE rewards generated being airdropped to stakers over time. Upon the launch of Astroport, ASTRO tokens generated from this protocol-owned LP can be airdropped to MINE stakers as well.

Let me know what yall think about this… if there aren’t any strong opinions I’ll put up a governance poll on this soon.


In general I like this proposal. A lot of the points mentioned are emerging from the discussions we are having in other posts.
As I already said I would like to make sure how the treasury is handled (multisig, smart contract driven and so on): a treasury handling is alone a big topic. You can see apollo safe and, historically, YFI in ethereum. It really requires a DAO roadmap and fully considering the right compromise in decentralizing. Tbh I think that some big strong wallets are positive: normally are held by people who know what they are doing and have a clear interest in the protocol success. For me just the credible intention of going through a decentralized handling is good at inception: but requires active partecipation and committed people. Probably the treasury related decisions should be made weighting voting power by lockup duration for the used MINE (a kind of crv like approach with an xMINE token: it is happening in many projects).

About the proposal: once the treasury decision is taken I would not airdrop immediately the astro (eventually) farmed. Just add to treasury and decide afterwards what to do. It could make sense just to use them to vote in astroport to direct reward boost to mine - ust pool or some projects who uses our launchpad feature and are particularly generous towards pylon.

For the UST in anchor: it is a great idea consistent with some discussion already happening in the forum. When a new project joins could be possible to make a first VC like offer for adding at low cost to the pylon treasury. This benefits the stakeholders without the need of claiming and stimulate active governance to decide how to allocate the various parts of the treasury.
On top of it the idea of rewarding active governance versus passive staking, as done in mirror, will add another reason to partecipate and allow little stakeholders to increase their amount of owned mine.

The implication of these decisions is some implementation work. This has to be properly prioritized to have a good capital allocation. Pylon cannot for sure implement 10 little projects in parallel, but will need to plan carefully priorities and reusability of features.


Hi, I love your proposal, just a few thoughts:

  1. I feel like at the start we need a larger % going to POL until we stop the bleeding on inflation for mine-ust incentives. Once we reach a set treshold we can tune this % down. Im thinking at least 50-60% to start

  2. It would be great to ‘leverage’ our POL efforts by using token allocations allocated to something else (for example some of the incentives reserved for mine ust). This way the ust comes from the protocol yield and the mine comes from the total supply. This way we reach an acceptable treshold faster and we use these incentives in a way that doesn’t dilute current holders while speeding up the POL process!

If you make these changes I would def vote yes, but would probably anyway cuz any move in this direction is great

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Would this solve 2 @Herbdragon?

Now we are talking, these were the kind of details I was missing. Thank you for that.

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imo it might be better to jsut do more for UST for ex. 60% for ust,and 20% 20% for buybacks and lp, especially if the aim of establishing the treasury is to accumululate ust

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Well yes @Woody, sorry I hadn’t read your comments yet:).

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love the idea! this will eliminate with time the need for expensive LP costs, when sizeable LP is achieved we can vote on the next thing the project needs to accomplish and redirect the revenue there. if nothing is urgent maybe a buy back for stakers but also some can be burnt, or used to create a healthier treasury.

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Others have mentioned this, but some portion of the treasury should be used to invest in protocol IDOs, potentially through Pylon pools. Tokens should later be held and staked. Governance votes can distribute tokens at a later date as necessary (primarily if market value dips below intrinsic)