The TWD team has missed quite a few deadlines on the delivery of the project, there are also been a very bad lack of communication from the team, as an investor I think we need some feedback about what’s really going on.
Also must add, mentioning of changing the way they launch their Land NFT by being able to use UST and not Soley TWD, and delays in announcing the winners of NFT of land from depositing UST into the pools (Delayed till Jan), this is just whats been mentioned, curious on anything else they have decided to change?
On the top of this kind of situation, I think we need a proper procedure to give some penalties on a certain project, so that the project teams can be more interested in setting/meeting their project milestones. (e.g. yellow card (pool interest redirected to the treasury/investors for some time duration), red card (delisting and total withdrawal))
Yes completely agreed. We were just discussing this in the TG chat. I think its important to keep it simple and not overcomplicate the process. This is what I gathered from the discussion:
A voting parameter for each Pylon Pool project that will allow MINE Stakers to vote on ‘confidence’ level of projects perhaps every 2 weeks or month
Depending on the outcome of the confidence level of 0% - 100%, we set parameters / rules to be decided by the community. For instance, confidence level of 80% means project to carry on as is. Confidence level between 50 - 80% means emission of yield redirection 19% from anchor gets reduced to 17%, remaining 2% to treasury. Confidence level below 50% means depositors will have option to withdraw / redirect funds to another pool, and emission gets reduced to 14% and 5% redirected to treasury.
To incentivize active participation in voting the excess funds from treasury will be paid to MINE stakers who actively vote (much like Mirror voting system).
It is also important to gauge intent and whether this is fair to projects. I personally think MINE stakers are incentivized to vote fairly, and over time as the community educates itself, even more so.
If a project is not performing according to their whitepaper/roadmap/medium articles/communication, voters vote low confidence to withdraw funds and penalize projects. If a project is doing well, MINE stakers are incentivized to give a vote of confidence to encourage a project to continue thriving as this will promote Pylon’s overall image and growth as a successful launchpad, which will in turn favour MINE stakers.
- Assessing confidence is another matter altogether. Whether projects want to release quarterly report, update their community, etc etc. I think that should be kept open for projects to decide. It is not difficult to appease your community especially with such high funding.
EDIT: Want to add some points to above:
I think it would be useful to show estimated monthly figure in UST that is directed to projects from the yield on each project page. Also when projects raise their proposal on the forum, they can put an expected monthly yield target to realize their project roadmap. This way we can align the expectations on both sides (investor and project).
Show a link to team wallet address that gets the UST from yield for transparency.
To gate entry into Pylon Pools (this one is mentioned in other posts but I felt it would be good to add here) - gate entry by MINE staked.
0-1000MINE staked = capped at 1000UST
1000-100000 MINE staked = capped at 1UST per MINE
100000 and above MINE staked = no limit
I think above is a very minimal entry barrier to the pools. Of course, these numbers can be changed around if we have some analytics, or after community discussion.
To ensure users to not buy and sell MINE just to enter into pools, MINE MUST be staked during duration of pools. Without MINE staked, emission gets reduced into half, or users have option to withdraw funds but at the cost of losing their tokens.
That projects include in their whitepaper the standards by which the community might fairly measure confidence should be best practice. It goes without saying, but it’s only fair that teams be held accountable.
Hi simon, thank you for the response, you highlighed most of my thought in a better way then i could have. I agree with this approach, giving a spectrum of confidence is briliiant.
a Pylon public hearing?
I agree with simplicity and efficiency.
Only by holding projects team accountable, Pylon would be able to establish itself as the platform that produces quality IDO projects.
talking about Pylon or TWD?
This is about Terraworld TWD
I like the things that @SimonSez is putting forward, however I believe that we should split this into two gov proposals
1 for the governance of team performance and redirection of yield
2 one for gated entry to pools.
i feel that a generic escrow smart contract in terra is needed and its integration in pylon a must
NFT airdrops for $TWD stakers… but how about Pylon Pool participants (who have locked $TWD rewards, practically the same as staking $TWD, since they’re buying $TWD with $UST rewards from Anchor in the backend)?
I feel Pylon Pool stakers here should be treated as $TWD stakers, and receive airdrops.
Agree - it is normal in the world of VC that portfolio companies report quarterly on progress metrics!
Team (hires, departures, open roles w/ links to job descriptions so investor can help w/ recruiting)
Go to Market
We need to see a quarterly report like this from TerraWorld before we can draw any conclusions about how the project is tracking relative to plan and expectations.
I am in favour of accountability in Protocol Pools. However, this is very open to interpretation. If Pylon was held to this standard, I’m sure last month many people would have voted to withdraw from $Mine pools or redirect some of that yield. Same thing with $Loop and $VKR now. These are early days for these protocols and I’m not sure how closely we can force them to adhere to a roadmap.
So I think we need very concrete standards to judge projects by. Otherwise many $mine stakers may vote based on price action (wanting to exit a poor performing pool) which means the protocol may face a double whammy of reduced yield at the same time their token price is dropping for reasons possibly outside their reasonable control.
If we implement auto-staking for locked reward tokens, I think people would be less keen to move, since many of the tokens which have had their prices wrecked recently also have highly inflationary tokenomics, and so locked token balances would be growing somewhat in tandem with the declining price, thus cushioning the reward value.
I created a proposal for that here: Auto staking for pool rewards
This is a great point. If Pylon was kept to this standard it would have received some pretty low confidence scores. Yet a lot of us here appreciate that although presenting with issues, Pylon was well worth continuing with. The herd mentality of crypto can be pretty rough with knee jerk reactivity.
This is a really nuanced situation and I am struggling to think of a good way to implement decentralised voting for it.
Here are my thoughts.
I feel if Pylon Pool Tokens (similar/same to the proposal by Nexus) are implemented then this would resolve a lot of the issues raised here. This however doesn’t solve the issue of projects still receiving funding if they’re genuinely misleading/scamming Pylon pool investors. Although an extreme situation, this is something that might also need resolving.
I also like the idea of having a quarterly report for Pool investors. We could implement a ‘kill switch’ with this. Here is how I see this.
Pylon Pool teams have to report to the Pylon community quarterly. If there is serious concern of misleading/scamming behaviour, then the project’s team will be required to do an AMA with both the Pylon community and Pylon Council separately. If both parties agree that there is significant misleading/scamming behaviour after the AMA, then a vote is put up to governance whereby allowing the pool contributors to withdraw all UST and all project tokens accumulated to date.
The benefit of having the Pylon Council involved is that by being a smaller more aligned group, they present an opportunity to have a more nuanced discussion with the project whereby hopefully mitigating any knee jerk ‘kill switch’ responses, something that would have likely happened to Pylon.
This could work in pretty much the same way as @SimonSez’s proposal above.
In addition, would it be useful to have a time delay on the kill switch. lets say 2 weeks? i.e. first vote to activate kill switch executed, another vote 2 weeks later also needs to be executed for withdrawals to go ahead. This might also help mitigate miscommunications.
who are pylon council members? I don’t want to be represented in a specific case without a govenrance action stating council members mandate. I think council is a very good idea but has to work in the boundaries of a DAO.
About TWD: pylon is mainly financing the project. At the moment we are like a venture capitalist which is checking roadmap and investment perspective. To me now the criticality is land sale: If they think not to use twd but ust it is bad for gateway partecipants and looks like they are aiming to a double source for UST with twd the clear loser of the strategy. The team has given away a lot of TWD and there could be a conflict of interest. Pylon has the governance to promote eventual actions (I mean an internal discussion).
P.S. Are the mine(s) paid for a proposal refunded like happens i.e. with mirror?